

**INTERDICTION OF COMMUNICATIVE FACILITIES IN ROMANIA
(MPC Romanian Plan)**

The Problem

To interdict the main lines of railway communication in Rumania which would provide the necessary logistical support for a Soviet move westward.

The Proposal

To establish an effective pattern of resistance centers and resistance personnel throughout Rumania, organized and equipped to carry out, on a continuing basis, a coordinated campaign of demolition and sabotage against trackage, trackage equipment, repair facilities, major bottlenecks and rolling stock.

General Remarks:

In a recently submitted analysis of this problem, its proposed solution (the McDowell Plan) was presented in the form of a detailed system of track breakage applicable under wartime conditions to the whole Eastern European area. The proposed system, supported by small partisan units, would apparently function mile by mile at 24-hour intervals over the entire length of the major rail lines between the Soviet Union, the Orbit states, and the front lines in the West.

The pattern of personnel distribution suggested by the above plan represents a classroom solution of the problem. In practice, this pattern would require more resistance personnel, dispersed at more precise and regular intervals than can now be planned or contemplated, would pose

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greater supply and control problems than we are now in a position to solve, and would probably also result in a greater dispersal of our guerrilla resistance forces than we could consider advisable at this stage. The plan has merit, however, in that it reemphasizes the vulnerability of Soviet communication lines from East to West, their relative importance in our planning with respect to an "offensive-defensive", and the most economical means available, through organized exploitation of the local resistance potential, for delivering a major blow against Soviet offensive capabilities.

Although the priority of mission over tactical considerations is a sound general principle, we are forced to base our plans for establishing the geographic pattern and intensity of resistance centers primarily on other, equally relevant, determining factors. Such factors include terrain, cover, accessibility to our own support as well as to the priority objectives, resident population and resistance elements, as well as local security forces. We must allow for these factors in allocating our available assets; any other approach would be unrealistic, even though it might be theoretically unassailable. Much will depend on the number and strength of the teams we shall have succeeded in establishing in the area by the target date, the degree of organization and numerical strength of the indigenous resistance forces, and on the general mood of the people. The cohesiveness of the local Communist organization and its ability to produce effective counter-resistance forces in the affected areas are likewise of prime importance. Our present plan of operations, although it does not conform literally to the proposed system, has been drawn up as a maximum effort within the terms of reference of current and projected capabilities.

With respect to OPC control of the Rumanian operations, our own planning calls for

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calls for centralized control originating in a US command center outside of Rumania and exerted through the intermediary of main command bases in the country. As presently conceived, our plans call for direct W/T communications between the various internal command centers and the OPC peripheral bases. The latter would coordinate the various activities of the internal bases independently, in order to maintain the security of each main base and radiating net. At the same time, it is recognized that control of the timing, particularly with respect to local demolition operations, will necessarily depend to some extent on local conditions existing at the time and on the judgment of the leader of the sector concerned. It is to be understood, however, that each local leader will have a standing order to fit his activities into the general framework of our requirements and directives, even though he might be forced to modify them in certain respects from time to time.

Fortunately, in the case of Rumania, the factors which will determine our tactical disposition of "command posts, bases and secondary redoubts" all operate to facilitate the attainment of our primary objectives and the consequent accomplishment of our mission, which, it should be noted, is not limited to the interdiction of railway communications.

In the initial phases of overt hostilities, or immediately preceding them, this operation would constitute only one of three basic tasks assigned to the OPC underground organization, to wit: (1) the specialized sabotage of selected targets, (2) the mounting of a large-scale popular and guerrilla resistance movement against the regime in power, and (3) the interdiction of railway traffic. Nevertheless, the current view that rail interdiction might well

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might well be considered as a separate operation in itself, especially planned, organized and possibly assigned to a special net for implementation, has considerable merit. Rail interdiction, as proposed, would take place, however, only under very intensified cold war conditions or on the outbreak of hostilities, and then only on the authority and request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Discussion (The OPC Plan)

Our present objective in Rumania is the establishment, within the first twelve months from the start of the Project (set for June 1951) of a skeleton underground capable of undertaking significant resistance activity by the end of 1952.

In developing the Rumanian Plan, we have organized our projected operations around the configuration of terrain and the presence of natural cover, which, taken in conjunction with other local determining factors, combine to form exceptionally favorable conditions for the success of our Project. From the attached overlay, it is readily apparent that the Western and Northern sectors of Rumania are dominated by three general areas ideally suited to our purposes and all lying within 50 miles of priority targets. Likewise, in the central area, shaded in yellow, there are sufficient favorable factors to permit the extension of our operations eastward (roughly 125 miles) to approach the main rail line from Bucharest to the strategic NW section of Rumania via Brasov. This line carries possibly 60% of the traffic in the E-W direction. However, continued reinforcement of the south-westerly route from Bucharest via Craiova and Turnu Severin has increased the capacity of this line to above prewar levels (despite the
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current pattern of traffic from Rumania to the USSR) and makes it a target of equal importance.

Establishment of our first two main command bases in Rumania--the first in the Muntii Apuseni region north of Deva and the second in the dorsal area of the Transylvanian Alps between Caransebes and Targu-Jiu--will thus place us within striking distance of the primary rail lines in the western half of Rumania, as well as within easy range of the two major industrial centers of Resita and Hunedoara. Rail sectors affected would be, on the more northerly route, the Teius-Oradea and Teius-Arad sectors, and, in the south, the Filiasi-Caransebes sector, a total length of roughly 400 miles.

The mountainous region northwest of lower Campulung would shelter a major operational base (Base #3) covering the Ploesti-Brasov and Brasov-Rupea sectors, a total rail length of approximately 40 miles. The rail lines between Bucuresti and Craiova are not considered vulnerable to the type of operation envisaged at this time.

Establishment of a fourth base (third command center) in the mountains east or north of Bistrita will give us an advance redoubt within close proximity to the northern east-west line between upper Campulung and Deva. Although this line is considered of secondary importance in view of its limited capacity, non-standard trackage and general vulnerability, its carrying capacity is reportedly being augmented. Moreover, penetrations to the south-east from this base will place our advance teams within striking distance of the primary rail lines entering Rumania from the USSR, via Iasi and Marasesti (125-175 miles from the main base).

Until the formulation of a detailed operational plan based on careful

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review of all the factors involved, the above pattern of main command and operational bases should be considered to be a preliminary view. Modifications will be introduced as required.

Within twelve months of the start of this Project (by the end of June 1952), a total of four secure bases, three of which will be command centers, are to be established in the general areas indicated above, with a minimum of 40-50 indigenous agents, properly trained and equipped, in position inside Rumania and covering, to some extent, the majority of our primary objectives.

Each of the three command centers presently projected would constitute an area command post under a native Rumanian having a rank comparable to that of Colonel. The local resistance bands, when they exist, would be organized into partisan companies capable of being expanded into larger units with the initiation of large-scale guerrilla activities. It is believed that each of the command areas envisaged would be capable of maintaining and providing refuge for guerrilla units totaling 3-5000 combattants. Liaison between Area Command Headquarters and local partisan commanders should be performed by indigenous OPC-trained agents (rank equivalent to Major, in view of the planned expansion of guerrilla companies into battalions of some 300 fighters).

Present OPC plans call for the activation of a total of 15,000 guerrillas immediately preceding or following the initiation of hostilities. Trained cadres for this guerrilla force will be taken from a Rumanian Guard Company (500 men) trained and maintained at a holding-center to be established in the Eastern Mediterranean area in the latter half of 1951. As soon as groups of these agents have completed their training, they will be

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infiltrated into Rumania as required to provide reinforcements for the 40-50 agents whose training will begin immediately the Project is put into operation. These follow-up groups of "guerrilla activators" will assist in organizing resistance elements and will penetrate major targets as specialized sabotage teams. It is not planned, however, that our guerrilla forces will be strong enough within the first year to engage in pitched battles with the mobile Rumanian counter-resistance brigades even if it were deemed desirable, although sufficient local strength may be available for isolated raids against selected targets. A primary aim during the first 9-12 months will be to keep the underground organization in existence and expanding, above all avoiding the discovery and resultant probable destruction of our main bases.

Although no firm estimate exists regarding the number of persons hiding out in the Rumanian mountains or the number of organized guerrillas (figures range from 3,000 to 30,000 or more), for our purposes we shall accept the figure of 2,000 as a reasonable estimate for the total number of "outlaws" immediately or readily available. Probably not more than 500 of these are actually organized into armed resistance bands at the present moment.

Personnel Requirements

In the initial stages of the underground's development, it is planned to rely exclusively on indigenous agents. Recruitment, processing and training of an initial contingent of 50 Rumanian agents, whose names and preliminary screening will be provided by one or more of the Rumanian refugee organizations cooperating with OPC, will begin at once following the Project's inception. As indicated above under the discussion of the Plan, a guerrilla activator force of 500 Rumanian trainees will be recruited later in 1951 and the early part of 1952. A total of approximately 40 Americans will be required in supporting operations. No US personnel

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personnel will be infiltrated into Rumania until the inception of hostilities, unless requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in anticipation of imminent hostilities.

Each of the four main command and operational bases will have a chief W/T operator and an assistant. A total of 10 W/T operators, both Chiefs and Assistants, will be sufficient during the first 6-9 months. However, as the radiating nets are developed and new redoubts established, it will be necessary to expand progressively our communications nets, particularly to assure control over the specific sectors involved in reconnaissance and intelligence work and in the interdiction of rail lines. A total of 50 W/T operators and their assistants should be recruited and trained for use by the end of June 1952. An additional 20 US W/T operators should be available, as a minimum, by the end of the same period.

Operating Procedures

In establishing initial all-purpose radiating nets from each of the main command and operational centers, out of a ten-man team, six agents would be available for the formation of 3 two-man teams. These would fan out in opposite directions for the purpose of establishing contact with whatever local resistance groups may exist in the area, obtaining operational intelligence and setting up a working relationship with the resistance leaders contacted. In later phases of their activity, the resistance groups uncovered or subsequently organized will be provided with communications equipment, arms, demolition materials and other supplies. Certain resistance leaders may be selected for exfiltration to OPC bases outside the country for further debriefing, indoctrination and training. In subsequent stages the underground will be organized on the

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principle of separate specialized missions performed by separate and distinct nets.

A primary goal of the GPO liaison agents will be to obtain the cooperation of local leaders in infiltrating their own personnel back into the villages located along the major rail sectors for the purpose of creating a local resistance "home guard". These would operate safe houses and cooperate actively with the underground in other activities, including ultimately the rail interdiction campaign. Rudiments of a passive organization undoubtedly exist in many of the villages. Probably not more than two or three of the local inhabitants would need to be brought into active operations, at least in the formative stages of the "home guard". On the general principle of one man per mile of trackage required to cover adequately the sectors described under the Plan discussion, a total of approximately 750 active track-demolition personnel would be sufficient as an initial force for this purpose.

In the interdiction of rail communications, the Rumanian underground will resort to a variety of techniques directed against the trackage itself, trackage equipment, isolated bridges and tunnels, rolling stock and major bottlenecks. The sectors covered by local "home guard" personnel constitute less than half of the total mileage of priority rail lines and are generally confined to the most vulnerable districts. Instead of operating on a 24 hour basis, trackage demolition will be worked out on alternating and irregular, although synchronized schedules, in order to afford as much protection as possible to the demolition personnel and assure the maximum of destruction with a minimum of demolition materials. Local resistance bands will, at the same time, organize: (1) special demolition teams for selected targets and parked rolling stock, (2) diversionary actions to

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deflect rail guards from selected areas or targets, and (3) raiding groups against stalled rolling stock for the seizure of weapons, supplies, etc. The OPC underground will provide special sabotage teams for strikes against priority targets and major bottlenecks, with support from the local resistance bands whenever necessary. The overlay attached hereto indicates bridging and tunnels which in many cases would not be sufficiently well guarded to prevent carefully planned operations from succeeding. In addition to interdicting the priority lines of communication, the underground will also direct its attention to the numerous secondary rail lines paralleling the main lines which could serve as alternate routes, despite their limited capacities.

Conclusions

1. The feasibility, economy and effectiveness of rail traffic interdiction warrant the elevation of this phase of normal underground activity to a position of priority as a separate task, specially planned, organized and executed.
2. Organization of this phase of OPC resistance activity would have to be coordinated with the overall plan for the establishment of the OPC underground and, during the initial stages at least, would be entirely dependent upon the progress achieved in establishing the underground.
3. Operating procedures should not be limited to any one technique but should be a combination of several, utilizing in varying degrees, depending on local conditions, the capabilities available to the OPC underground including local "home guard" personnel, the local resistance bands, specialized OPC sabotage teams and, in more developed stages, the full resources of the armed guerrilla units.

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